

The Information Bottleneck for Optimal Prediction of the Voter Model

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in den **Naturwissenschaften**

Conference on Complex Systems 2015

Tempe, Arizona / September 28 – October 2



Mathematics for Multilevel
Anticipatory Complex Systems



MAX-PLANCK-GESELLSCHAFT


General Setting



$$X^0 \xrightarrow{T^t} X^t \xrightarrow{T^\tau} X^{t+\tau}$$


- Markovian Kernel $T(X^{t+1}|X^t)$
- Initial State $X^0 \in \Sigma$
- Current State $X^t \in \Sigma$ with Current Time $t \in \mathbb{N}$
- Future State $X^{t+\tau} \in \Sigma$ with Prediction Horizon $\tau \in \mathbb{N}$

General Setting




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- Post-measurement $\psi : \Sigma \rightarrow \mathcal{S}_\psi$ defined by $\Pr(\psi(X)|X)$

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- Pre-measurement $\phi : \Sigma \rightarrow \mathcal{S}_\phi$ defined by $\Pr(\phi(X)|X)$

The Optimal Prediction Problem




The Information Bottleneck Method [Tishby et al., 1999]:

- **Maximize** Predictive Capacity $\max_{\phi} I(\phi(X^t); \psi(X^{t+\tau}))$
- **Minimize** Measurement Complexity $\min_{\phi} I(X^t; \phi(X^t))$
- **Minimize** the IB-variational

$$\min_{\Pr(\hat{X}|X)} I(X^t; \phi(X^t)) - \beta I(\phi(X^t); \psi(X^{t+\tau})) \quad \text{with } \beta \in \mathbb{R}^+$$

Constraining the Set of Feasible Measurements




- Given a collection $\Phi = \{\phi_1, \dots, \phi_k\}$ of *feasible* pre-measurements
- Minimize** the IB-variational

$$\min_{\phi \in \Phi} \quad I(X^t; \phi(X^t)) - \beta \ I(\phi(X^t); \psi(X^{t+\tau})) \quad \text{with } \beta \in \mathbb{R}^+$$

Application to Agent-based Systems




- Agent Set $\Omega = \{1, \dots, N\}$
- Agent States $X_1^t \in S, X_2^t \in S, \dots, X_k^t \in S$
- System State $X^t = (X_1^t, X_2^t, \dots, X_N^t) \in \Sigma = S^N$



Application to Agent-based Systems



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- System State $X^t = (X_1^t, X_2^t, \dots, X_N^t) \in \Sigma = S^N$
- Generic Measurement μ
a family of measurements $(\mu_A : \Sigma \rightarrow \mathcal{S}_\mu)$ for any $A \subset \Omega$
such that $\Pr(\mu_A(X)|X) = \Pr(\mu_A(X)|(X_i)_{i \in A})$



The Poset of Feasible Measurements



$$\begin{matrix} X_1 \\ X_5 & X_2 \\ X_4 & X_3 \end{matrix}$$

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The Poset of Feasible Measurements



$$\begin{matrix} X_1 \\ X_5 \quad X_2 \\ X_4 \quad X_3 \end{matrix}$$

AGENT

$\mu_{\{1\}}(X)$

$$\begin{matrix} X_1 \\ X_5 \quad X_2 \\ X_4 \quad X_3 \end{matrix}$$

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MICRO

$$(\mu_{\{1\}}, \dots, \mu_{\{N\}})(X)$$

A diagram showing five circles labeled X_1 through X_5 arranged in a pentagonal pattern. The circles are positioned such that they overlap in a way that suggests a shared resource or a joint measurement space, as indicated by the label "MICRO" above them.

The Poset of Feasible Measurements



$$\begin{matrix} X_1 \\ X_5 \quad X_2 \\ X_4 \quad X_3 \end{matrix}$$

AGENT

$$\mu_{\{1\}}(X)$$

$$\begin{matrix} X_1 \\ X_5 \quad X_2 \\ X_4 \quad X_3 \end{matrix}$$

MACRO

$$\mu_{\{1, \dots, N\}}(X)$$

$$\begin{matrix} X_1 \\ X_5 \quad X_2 \\ X_4 \quad X_3 \end{matrix}$$

$$\begin{matrix} X_1 \\ X_5 \quad X_2 \\ X_4 \quad X_3 \end{matrix}$$

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$$\mu_{\{1\}}(X)$$

$$\begin{matrix} X_1 \\ X_5 \quad X_2 \\ X_4 \quad X_3 \end{matrix}$$

MACRO

$$\mu_{\{1, \dots, N\}}(X)$$

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MULTI

$$(\mu_{\{1\}}, \mu_{\Omega}(X))$$

$$\begin{matrix} X_1 \\ X_5 \quad X_2 \\ X_4 \quad X_3 \end{matrix}$$

MICRO

$$(\mu_{\{1\}}, \dots, \mu_{\{N\}})(X)$$


The Poset of Feasible Measurements



$$\begin{matrix} \text{EMPTY} & X_1 \\ \mu_\emptyset(X) & X_5 \quad X_2 \\ & X_4 \quad X_3 \end{matrix}$$





AGENT

$$\mu_{\{1\}}(X)$$




MACRO

$$\mu_{\{1, \dots, N\}}(X)$$




$$(\mu_{\{1\}}, \mu_\Omega(X))$$



$$(\mu_{\{1\}}, \dots, \mu_{\{N\}})(X)$$

The Poset of Feasible Measurements



Definition 1 (Additivity)

μ additive iff $\forall A \cap B = \emptyset$,

$$H(\mu_{A \cup B}(X) | \mu_A(X), \mu_B(X)) = 0$$
$$H(\mu_A(X) | \mu_{A \cup B}(X), \mu_B(X)) = 0$$

Definition 2 (Refinement)

$\phi_1 \prec \phi_2$
iff $X \rightarrow \phi_1(X) \rightarrow \phi_2(X)$ is Markovian
iff $I(X; \phi_2(X) | \phi_1(X)) = 0$

Theorem 1 (Monotonicity)


$\phi_1 \prec \phi_2 \Rightarrow$
 $I(\phi_1(X^t); \psi(X^{t+\tau})) \geq I(\phi_2(X^t); \psi(X^{t+\tau}))$
and $I(X^t; \phi_1(X^t)) \geq I(X^t; \phi_2(X^t))$

The Voter Model



- Set of Agents $\Omega = \{1, \dots, N\}$
- State of i th Agent $X_i^t \in \{0, 1\}$
- System State $X^t = (X_1^t, \dots, X_N^t) \in \{0, 1\}^N$
- Transitions Kernel $T(X^{t+1}|X^t)$ given by an interaction graph:

arc (i, j) selected $\Rightarrow X_j^{t+1} = X_i^t$ and $\forall k \neq j, X_k^{t+1} = X_k^t$



[Kimura & Weiss, 1964] [Banisch & Lima, 2012]



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$t = 0 \rightarrow$ arc $(3, 2)$



[Kimura & Weiss, 1964] [Banisch & Lima, 2012]



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$t = 1$



[Kimura & Weiss, 1964] [Banisch & Lima, 2012]



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$t = 1 \rightarrow \text{arc } (5, 4)$




[Kimura & Weiss, 1964] [Banisch & Lima, 2012]

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

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$t = 2 \rightarrow \text{arc } (2, 5)$




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

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$t = 3 \rightarrow \text{arc } (5, 4)$




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

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$t = 5 \rightarrow \text{arc } (2, 1)$



[Kimura & Weiss, 1964] [Banisch & Lima, 2012]



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$t = 6$



[Kimura & Weiss, 1964] [Banisch & Lima, 2012]



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$t = 6$




[Kimura & Weiss, 1964] [Banisch & Lima, 2012]

Aggregated-states in the Complete Graph




- All arcs are equally likely $\forall (i, j) \in \Omega^2, \quad \Pr(\text{arc } (i, j)) = \frac{1}{N(N-1)}$
- Uniform Initial State $\forall x \in \{0, 1\}^N, \quad p(X^0 = x) = 2^{-N}$




Aggregated-states in the Complete Graph




- All arcs are equally likely $\forall (i, j) \in \Omega^2, \quad \Pr(\text{arc } (i, j)) = \frac{1}{N(N-1)}$
- Uniform Initial State $\forall x \in \{0, 1\}^N, \quad p(X^0 = x) = 2^{-N}$
- Generic Measurement $\forall A \subset \Omega, \quad \eta_A(x) = \sum_{i \in A} x_i$
(Aggregated-state Measurement)




Predicting the Macroscopic Measurement




Predicting the Macroscopic Measurement




Fixed horizon $\tau = 3$




Fixed time $t = 100$




Predicting the Agent Measurement




Fixed horizon $\tau = 3$



Fixed time $t = 0$



The Two-community Graph




First Community Ω_1


Second Community Ω_2

Coupling Parameter $\rho = \frac{\Pr(\text{inter edge})}{\Pr(\text{intra edge})} < 1$

Predicting the Agent Measurement




Fixed time $t = 0$




Some Other Heterogeneous Interaction Graphs




Homogeneous Case: $\rho_{1 \rightarrow 2} = \rho_{2 \rightarrow 1} = 1$




Follower Case: $\rho_{1 \rightarrow 2} = 1/5$ and $\rho_{2 \rightarrow 1} = 1$



Leader Case: $\rho_{1 \rightarrow 2} = 1$ and $\rho_{2 \rightarrow 1} = 1/5$




Symmetrical Case: $\rho_{1 \rightarrow 2} = \rho_{2 \rightarrow 1} = 1/5$



Predicting the Agent Measurement in the Ring



Fixed time $t = 0$





- Application Perspectives
 - Optimal prediction of **economic indicators** based on multilevel structures of the international trade network
 - Optimal prediction of **population dynamics** in ecology based on multilevel representation of the inter-species mutual dependencies
- Theoretical Perspectives
 - Taking into account the **problem of inferability** of low-level predictors when solving the optimisation problem (e.g., Bayesian model selection)
 - Taking into account **domain-depend costs and rewards** as practical objective functions to be optimised in real-world scenarios

Thank you for your attention



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